Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi. “Reconciling after Civil Conflict Increases Social Capital but Decreases Individual Wellbeing” Science. 352.6287 (2016): 787-794. Link to paper here.
The data and .do files for all the tables can be found here
Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi. “The White-Man Effect: How Foreigner Presence Affects Behavior in Experiments.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,. 118 (2015): 397-414. Link here
“How to improve teaching practice? Experimental comparison of centralized training and in-classroom coaching.” with Fleish, B. and Taylor, S. A draft is available here
“Pay for Locally Monitored Performance? A Welfare Analysis for Teacher Attendance in Uganda.” With Kasirye, I., Leaver, C., Serneels, P., and Zeitlin, A.
Revise and Resubmit at, Journal of Public Economics.
“Who should monitor the (school) monitors? Theory and evidence from a community monitoring experiment in Ugandan primary schools.” With Leaver, C. and Zeitlin, A.
Abstract. Community monitoring of public service delivery has great appeal to improve performance through strengthening the “short route” of accountability, but often fails in practice, possibly due to high monitoring costs. In this paper we evaluate a teacher bonus scheme, experimentally varying the identity of a monitor - either the head teacher, or a parent, or both – who is required to submit weekly reports on teacher attendance using a mobile phone. We find the bonus scheme is most effective when the head teacher is responsible for monitoring. There is no impact when parents are the designated monitors, most likely due to high costs of monitoring. They play an important role as auditors though: When parents and head teachers are required to jointly report on attendance, the attendance remains similar in magnitude to the case when only head teachers monitor, but the cost of bonus payments is substantially reduced.
“School inspections with motivated bureaucrats.” With Habyarimana, J., Mbiti, I. and Asim, S.
£4.2m from Department for International Development (DFID)
In a randomized evaluation, we will test if a well-designed school inspection program in Tanzania can improve school performance, and how this depends on the financial incentives faced by mid-level bureaucrats to demonstrate improvement in these inspections.
“Information on school exam performance and bureaucratic accountability.” With Mbiti, I. and Zeitlin, A.
We use quasi-experimental methods to retrospectively evaluate the impact of a nation-wide publication of school rankings on end-of-year exam performance in Tanzania. We hypothesize that the worse-performing schools in a district will face more pressure from district officials to improve performance. Our identification comes from variation in within-district ranking for schools of similar absolute performance. To further unpack potential theoretical channels of impact, we examine the relationships of support and accountability between parents, schools, district education officers, and elected officials.
“Leveraging mobile technology to increase financial inclusion in East Africa.” With Jack, W.
$3.5m from Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation